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Violation of Rule 10b-5 As a Predicate Act Under Civil
RICO
Introduction
In Securities Investor Protection Corporation v. Vigman,' the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals examined a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO) 2 claim predicated upon violations of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 and its accompanying
Rule lOb-5. 4 Plaintiffs in the case were the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC) and the trustees appointed by the SIPC to handle
the liquidation of two securities brokerage firms. The SIPC was established by Congress5 in 1970 to provide greater protection to customers
6
of brokers and dealers and members of national securities exchanges.
It insures customers of brokerage firms in a manner similar to the way
the FDIC insures depositors at banks. In Vigman, the SIPC had instituted
liquidation proceedings against and appointed trustees for two securities
brokers, First State Securities Corporation (FSSC) and Joseph Sebag
Inc. The SIPC and trustees were bringing an action for damages against
some of the former principals and employees of FSSC and Sebag, as
well as against officers and directors of six other companies, all of
whom the SIPC alleged had been "engaged in a scheme to manipulate
the stock of six companies traded in the over-the-counter market, and
[had] used FSSC and Sebag as vehicles in furtherance of this scheme."'
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the
grounds that the SIPC did not have standing to assert a claim under
RICO when that claim was based on alleged securities violations under
Rule lOb-5. The Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the SIPC did not
have to be a purchaser or seller of the securities at issue in order to
bring a Rule lOb-5 securities fraud claim under RICO. The purpose of
this article is to question the reasoning behind this decision. 8

Copyright 1991, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1988).
6. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir.
1990).
7. Id. at 1464.
8. The defendant does not challenge the standing of the trustee to bring such a
claim. Vigman, 908 F.2d at 1465 n.5.
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To properly understand the court's answer, and its significance, it
is necessary to have a full understanding of Rule lOb-5, its court imposed
purchaser/seller standing requirement, the reasons for the requirement,
and the relation of the requirement to a civil RICO claim.
Rule JOb-5 and its Standing Requirement
Rule lOb-5 was enacted by the Securities and Exchange Commission
and makes it unlawful to employ manipulative or deceptive devices "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 9 For many years,
there was debate over whether "in connection with the purchase or
sale" meant that the plaintiff had to have actually been a purchaser or
seller of a security in order to bring a lob-5 claim. In 1952, the Second
Circuit held, in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corporation, that lob-5 did
require the plaintiff to be a purchaser or seller. 10 This conclusion became
known as the Birnbaum rule, and it required that a plaintiff must have
bought or sold the securities at issue in order to file suit under Rule
lOb-5 for securities fraud.'"
In 1975, the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores finally stepped in to address the purchaser/seller standing requirement.12 The question in Blue Chip was whether offerees of a stock
offering "may maintain a private cause of action for money damages
where they allege that the offeror has violated the provisions of Rule
lob-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, but where they have
neither purchased nor sold any of the offered shares.' 3 The offering
was made pursuant to an antitrust consent decree and the offerees
claimed that Blue Chip intentionally made the prospectus "overly pessimistic" to discourage them from accepting what was supposed to be
a bargain offer so that the rejected shares might be offered to the
general public at a higher price. The price of the stocks soared over
the next few years, and the offerees who initially declined to purchase
the stocks wanted lost opportunity damages, the right to purchase the
4
previously rejected stock at its former price, and exemplary damages.
The Supreme Court rejected the claims of the plaintiffs and fully
endorsed the Birnbaum rule, basing its decision on legislative history,
the acceptance of two decades of lower court decisions following Birnbaum, and numerous policy factors. 5

9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
10. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
11. A list of some of the courts which followed Birnbaum before the advent of Blue
Chip Stamps can be found in note 59.
12. 421 U.S. 723, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
13. Id. at 725, 95 S. Ct. at 1920.
14. Id. at 727, 95 S. Ct. at 1921.
15. Though the plaintiffs were denied relief under lOb-5, they still had other theories
under which they could recover, such as common law fraud.
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With regard to legislative history, the Court pointed out that section
10(b) does not by its terms provide a civil remedy for its violation. A
private right of action was first implied in 1946 by a federal district
court in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.16 Although this implied private
right of action was implicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court twentyfive years later in Superintendent of Insurance of State of New York
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.17 and in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah
v. United States," s the high court said in Blue Chip that it felt more
constrained in dealing with an implied cause of action than it would
have with an express statutory remedy. Furthermore, in 1957 and again
in 1959, the SEC attempted to have Congress amend section 10(b) to
read "in connection with the purchase or sale of, or any attempt to
purchase or sell, any security."' 9 The attempts to add that clause failed,
indicating to the Blue Chip court a lack of Congressional intent to
expand the protection offered by section 10(b) to those not purchasers
or sellers. Perhaps the fact most compelling to the Court was that
Congress had, in parts of the 1934 Act, unequivocally extended protection
to offerees, demonstrating that "[w]hen Congress wished to provide a
remedy to those who neither purchase nor sell securities, it had little
' '20
trouble doing so expressly.
While the Court felt that it was important that the circuits had
been following Birnbaum for twenty years, this argument seemed to
carry less weight than did considerations of legislative intent or policy.
It seems unlikely that the Court would ratify any course of action it
found to be wrong, no matter how long it had been followed.
The policy considerations appear to have been the most important
factor to the Court in Blue Chip, since policy discussion consumed most
of the opinion. The Court was dealing with a judicially created remedy,
and felt it especially proper to consider policy factors when it came
time "to flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which neither
the congressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer
conclusive guidance." ' 2' The Court further acknowledged that "[w]e are
dealing with a private cause of action which has been judicially found
to exist, and which will have to be judicially delimited one way or
another unless and until Congress addresses the question. ' 22 The Court

16. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
17. 404 U.S. 6, 92 S. Ct. 165 (1971).
18. 406 U.S. 128, 92 S. Ct. 1456 (1972).
19. 103 Cong. Rec. 11636 (1957).
20. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734, 95 S. Ct. 1917,
1925 (1975).
21. Id. at 737, 95 S. Ct. at 1926.
22. Id. at 749, 95 S. Ct. at 1931-32.
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offered several overlapping "policy" justifications for requiring a plaintiff to be a purchaser or a seller to recover under Rule lOb-5. 23 The
first was that the very pendency of a lawsuit in this area can have
serious repercussions on the normal business activity of the defendant
totally unrelated to the lawsuit. Thus, so long as the plaintiff can avoid
dismissal or summary judgment, the case has a settlement value to the
plaintiff out of proportion to its prospect of success at trial. Secondly,
and relatedly, the Court was concerned with the potential for possible
abuse of discovery. Obviously, to broadly expand the class of plaintiffs
who may sue under Rule lOb-5 would appear to encourage plaintiffs
with groundless claims to tie up the resources of defendants, thereby
increasing the settlement value of an already overinflated claim. Thirdly,
[w]ithout the Birnbaum rule, an action under Rule lob-5 will
turn largely on which oral version of a series of occurrences
the jury may decide to credit, and therefore no matter how
improbable the allegations of the plaintiff, the case will be
virtually impossible to dispose of prior to trial other than by

settlement .24
Added to this was the fear that, without the Birnbaum rule, the trier
of fact would be faced with hazy issues of fact which would depend
almost entirely on oral testimony. The Court recognized this threat could
be minimized through fashioning unique rules of corroboration and
damages, but used this to suggest that the very need for these kinds of
special protections absent a purchaser/seller standing requirement argued
for the desirability of the Birnbaum rule. Lastly, the Court believed
that, in the absence of the Birnbaum rule,
bystanders to the securities marketing process could await developments on the sidelines without risk, claiming that inaccuracies in disclosure caused nonselling in a falling market and
that unduly pessimistic predictions by the issuer followed by a
rising market caused them to allow retrospectively golden opportunities to pass. 25

Even a cursory examination of these policy considerations reveals that
the Court's overriding concern was with unfounded claims which are
especially vexatious in the securities field. It is also clear that the Court
felt justified in relying so heavily on policy considerations because it
was interpreting a judicial remedy, not an express statutory remedy.
Predicate Acts, Rule lOb-5, and RICO
Complicating matters for the Vigman court was the fact that it was
not faced with a straightforward lOb-5 claim, but with a RICO claim

23.
24.
25.

Id. at 740-48, 95 S. Ct. at 1927-32.
Id. at 742, 95 S. Ct. at 1928.
Id. at 747, 95 S. Ct. at 1931.
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based upon lob-5 violations. Blue Chip conclusively determined that a
plaintiff must have been a purchaser or a seller to recover under a
straight lob-5 cause of action. RICO, in view of Vigman, is another
matter.
RICO is an acronym for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. It targets "racketeering activity," which it defines as
any act "chargeable" under several generically described state
criminal laws, any act "indictable" under numerous specific
federal criminal provisions, including mail and wire fraud, and
any "offense" involving bankruptcy or securities fraud or drug26
related activities that is "punishable" under federal law.
These various crimes which can form the basis of a RICO claim are
known as predicate acts. The commission of several predicate acts can
constitute a pattern of racketeering activity. What RICO does is outlaw
the use of income
derived from a "pattern of racketeering activity" to acquire an
interest in or establish an enterprise engaged in or affecting
interstate commerce; the acquisition or maintenance of any interest in an enterprise "through" a pattern of racketeering activity; conducting or participating in the conduct of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity; and conspiring to
27
violate any of these provisions.
The language employed in RICO is broad and, according to ABA
President Robert D. Raven, it permits a "reasonably artful advocate to
convert virtually any type of commercial dispute involving arguably
deceptive statements into a RICO claim.' '2a The administrative office of
the U.S. courts tracked 614 civil RICO filings in 1986 (the first year
it began keeping count), 1,095 in 1987, and 959 cases in 1988.29 Statistics
in this area, however, may be misleading because of the manner in
which the Administrative Office collects its data. Some authorities believe
that civil RICO related claims "may be as high as ten times these
figures." 30 Raven went on to note that, "[c]ivil RICO is being used
almost solely against legitimate business rather than organized crime."'"

26. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 481-82, 105 S.
3277 (1985).
27. Id. at 482-83, 105 S. Ct. at 3278.
28. American Bar Association Calls for Reform of Federal Racketeering
Newswire, June 7, 1989.
29. Id.
30. Hughes, RICO Reform: How Much Is Needed?, 43 Vand. L. Rev.
(1990).
31. American Bar Association Calls for Reform of Federal Racketeering
Newswire, June 7, 1989.

Ct. 3275,

Law, PR

639, 643
Law, PR
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Numerous courts have also been concerned with the far reaching impact
of civil RICO claims:
[W]e note the mounting controversy in the federal courts over
the proper limits, if any, upon the use of RICO in cases far
removed from the context which Congress had in mind when
it enacted the statute. Congress was out to attack the problem
of organized crime, not the problems
of corporate control
and risk arbitrage. We of course make no attempt to resolve
the dispute here and now. We do not propose to enter the fray.
We only note that the reach of RICO is itself a troubling
issue

....

12

While many federal courts have been troubled by the breadth of
RICO, in the past most of them were not tempted to "enter the fray"
lest they find themselves reversed on appeal. As the Supreme Court said
as it overruled two restrictions imposed on RICO by the Second Circuit:
"It is true that private civil actions under the statute are being
brought almost solely against such defendants [respected businesses], rather than against the archetypal, intimidating mobster.
Yet this defect-if defect it is-is inherent in the statute as
written, and its correction must lie with Congress.''"
While RICO remains a powerful force, it seems the pendulum of
RICO claims is already beginning to swing back, in large measure because
of the Supreme Court's opinion in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co.3 4 As mentioned above, one element of a RICO claim is
pattern; the defendant must have engaged in a pattern of racketeering
activity before he can be subject to RICO sanctions. RICO defines
"pattern of racketeering activity" to require "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this
chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any
period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity"."
In an attempt to rein in RICO, lower courts were interpreting the
pattern requirement in a multitude of conflicting ways,3 6 and the Supreme
Court used Northwestern Bell to resolve some of the confusion. 7 Al-

32. Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 1983).
33. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 499, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 32867 (1985) (footnote omitted).
34. 492 U.S. 229, 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
36. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone, 492 U.S. 229, 235 n.2, 109 S. Ct.
2893, 2898 n.2 (1989).
37. There issome disagreement over whether the Northwestern Bell definition will
be helpful in a practical sense. See id.at 251, 109 S. Ct. at 2906 (Scalia, J.,concurring).
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though the existence of a pattern will necessarily depend on the fact
and circumstances of each case, as a general rule, the Supreme Court
declared that a plaintiff "must show that the racketeering predicates
are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued
criminal activity." 3 8 As some circuits had allowed two predicate acts in
and of themselves to constitute a pattern,3 9 it is easy to see how the
stiffer pattern requirement would tend to make a RICO claim harder
to sustain, and would tend to curb the rising tide of claims being
brought.
The main attraction for attorneys representing plaintiffs is that, in
addition to creating criminal liability, RICO has a civil side which renders
a violator liable to the injured plaintiff for "threefold the damages he
4
sustains and the cost of the suit, including reasonable attorney's fee."''
With this sort of incentive, it is easy to understand the large number
of RICO claims being brought, 4' and it is easy to understand the
temptation for plaintiffs' lawyers to expand RICO's scope as much as
they can.
The Vigman Decision
As mentioned before, the Vigman 42 case involved an action by the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation, and trustees it had appointed,
against defendants who had allegedly "engaged in a scheme to manipulate
the stock of six companies traded in the over-the-counter market, and
.. . used FSSC and Sebag [two brokerage firms] as vehicles in furtherance of this scheme." '43 The defendants, officers and directors of
the six companies and former principals and employees of FSSC and
Sebag, allegedly maintained an illusion of active trading of the six stocks
through misleading transactions in the accounts of the defendant companies, in the accounts of the two brokerage houses, and in the accounts
of unsuspecting customers. When the alleged scheme was uncovered, the
price of the stocks fell drastically and, because FSSC and Sebag had
purchased and then held large amounts of the stock, they incurred heavy
losses leading to the liquidation proceeding. The SIPC liquidated the
two firms and reimbursed their customers the value of their cash and
securities as of the liquidation. In Vigman, the SIPC and the trustees
sued the defendants on behalf of the liquidated brokerage firms. The
trustees stood in the shoes of the firms that actually had purchased the

38.

Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 239, 109 S.Ct. at 2900.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 235 n.2, 109 S. Ct. at 2898 n.2.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
See supra text accompanying note 30.
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1464 (footnote omitted).
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stock, satisfying Blue Chip, so their standing to bring the RICO claims
predicated on lOb-5 violations was not questioned by the defendants."
The standing of the SIPC to bring such claims is what was at issue.
The Ninth Circuit decided that a plaintiff who is asserting a violation
of Rule lOb-5 as a predicate act of racketeering under RICO is not
bound by the purchaser/seller standing requirement formulated in Birnbaum and endorsed by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip. In other words,
for a plaintiff to assert an ordinary violation of lOb-5, he must have
been a purchaser or seller of securities but, if he is suing for treble
damages and attorneys' fees under RICO, he need not have been a
purchaser or seller to use the very same Rule lOb-5. How the court
reached this decision is noteworthy.
The first thing the Vigman court did was to compare the language
of the RICO statute with the language of Rule lOb-5. 45 RICO section
1961(1)(D) defines racketeering activity to include "any offense involving
• ..fraud in the sale of securities .... "46 Section 1964(c) provides that
"[any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
*of section 1962 .. .may sue therefor ...and shall recover threefold

the damages he sustains

. . .

.

47 The

court concluded that, on its face,

"the RICO text does not require a plaintiff to be a purchaser or seller,
4
so long as the plaintiff suffered injury 'by reason of' the alleged fraud." 1
In contrast, the court pointed out that, for conduct to be unlawful
under Rule 10b-5, it must have occurred "in connection with the purchase
' 49
or sale of any security. "
The Vigman court also pointed out that, while a private civil action
under lob-5 had been implied by the courts, RICO contains its own
express civil remedy. "The remedy of a private civil action under Rule
10b-5 having been court created, the Court has not been reluctant to
limit the class of plaintiffs who may bring such a private action." 5 The
RICO statute, however, has no requirement that the plaintiff be a
purchaser or a seller of securities. The court quoted from Blue Chip51
when it said:
[I]f Congress had legislated the elements of a private cause of
action for damages, the duty of the Judicial Branch would be
to administer the law which Congress enacted; the Judiciary may

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
1990).
49.
50.
51.

Id.at 1465 n.5.
Id.at 1466.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1988).
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
Vigman, 908 F.2d at 1466.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
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not circumscribe a right which Congress has conferred because
of any disagreement it might have with Congress about the
52
wisdom of creating so expansive a liability.
The court quoted the Supreme Court again, this time pulling language
from Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc,53 when it continued, "RICO
is to be read broadly. This is the lesson not only of Congress' selfconsciously expansive language and overall approach, but also of its
express admonition that RICO is to 'be liberally construed to effectuate
'5 4
its remedial purposes." '
Analysis
The Vigman decision squarely raises the question of what Congress
intended when it included "fraud in the sale of securities" as a potential
predicate act under RICO. "Fraud in the sale of securities" is understood
to mean federal security offenses such as violations of Rule lOb-5, but
what is not understood is whether Congress intended to carry forward
the standing requirements that had been developed by the courts. The
Vigman court concluded that Congress did not intend the Birnbaum
rule to be applied to a RICO claim, and this position is certainly
defensible. In addition to the arguments mentioned in Vigman, there is
the fact that, before RICO was enacted, there was no private cause of
action at all for many of the violations which may now be used as
predicate acts. For example, it was well established that a private citizen
had no cause of action under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes."
Then RICO was enacted to provide treble damages and attorneys fees
for a class of plaintiffs that previously had no standing at all under
the mail and wire fraud statutes. Similarly, before RICO, plaintiffs had
only limited standing to bring a lOb-5 action-they had to have been
a purchaser or a seller of securities. Maybe Congress did intend to do
away with this limitation on standing when the plaintiff is proceeding
under RICO. If in one instance Congress went from no standing to full
standing, it is not altogether unlikely that they intended to go from
limited standing to full standing in another. In addition, perhaps the
polices behind RICO justify giving a limited class of plaintiffs (purchasers

52. Vigman, 908 F.2d at 1466.
53. 473 U.S. 479, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
54. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir.
1990).
55. E.g., Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1977); Krupnick v.
Union National Bank, 470 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Milburn v. Blackfrica
Promotions, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 434, 435 (S.D. N.Y. 1974); Napper v. Anderson, Henley,
Shields, Bradford & Pritchard, 500 F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
837, 96 S. Ct. 65 (1975).
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and sellers) the right to sue for damages under lOb-5 while giving those
injured by a pattern of racketeering the right to sue for treble damages
and attorneys' fees.
However, it is equally as likely that Congress meant to incorporate
the existing lOb-5 standing requirement when it enacted the RICO legislation. In International Data Bank, LTD. v. Zepkin,5 6 the Fourth
Circuit held that a corporation which did not buy or sell any of its
own stock lacked standing to bring a civil RICO action based on Rule
lOb-5 securities fraud. Eugene Zepkin and Harold Grossman issued a
stock prospectus for their new firm, International Data Bank (IDB).
The outside investors eventually ousted Zepkin and Grossman and IDB
sued the two, claiming that the prospectus included a fraudulent statement in violation of federal securities laws. The court began by succinctly
stating that: "Because IDB based its RICO claim on a Rule lOb-5
predicate offense, the district court properly applied the standing requirements of that Rule in dismissing the action. 5 7 The court then
supported its conclusion in a manner strikingly similar to that employed
by the Vigman court.
The Zepkin court examined the language of the RICO statute and
found that "[tihe statutory language describing the predicate offense'fraud in the sale of securities'-is, however, narrow and suggests the
pivotal role of the actual sales transaction. ' 58 It then pointed out that
the RICO legislation was written in 1970 against thebackdrop of existing
federal securities law. The Birnbaum standing requirement came into
existence in 1952 and had by 1970 been followed by virtually all of the
lower federal courts facing the issue. 59 "If Congress had intended the
drastic result of overturning this consensus, it surely would have done
so in a more explicit way.'"'6 The Zepkin court continued:
We doubt that Congress meant, when it buried securities fraud
among all these offenses [the other enumerated predicate acts],
to overturn the rule established in Birnbaum. Where a predicate
offense already has a well-developed private right of action under
federal law, we think the better view is that Congress meant

56. 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1987).
57. Id.at 151.
58. Id.at 152.
59. See, e.g., Dyer v. Eastern Trust and Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 911-12
(N.D. Me. 1971); Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 96670 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909, 90 S. Ct. 2199 (1970); Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 589 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873, 95 S. Ct. 134
(1974); James v. Gerber Products Co., 483 F.2d 944, 947-50 (6th Cir. 1973); Erling v.
Powell, 429 F.2d 795, 798-99 (8th Cir. 1970); Horwitz v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line
Co., 438 F.2d 53, 55 (10th Cir. 1971).
60. Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 152.
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for RICO simply to expand the range of remedies by allowing
for treble damages and attorneys' fees, rather than to summarily
overturn the settled law. 6'
While the Vigman court summarily dismissed the policy concerns
behind the Birnbaum rule because RICO provides an express statutory
remedy, the Zepkin court felt differently because "many elements of
the RICO action, including that of standing, have not been clearly
legislated. With respect to those elements, we think it proper-and indeed
prudent-to consult the practical considerations that Blue Chip Stamps
addressed at such length .... -62
The fact that the Fourth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit take such
different views of remarkably similar facts exemplifies the ambiguity in
this important area of securities law. All of the policy considerations
behind the Supreme Court's initial endorsement of the Birnbaum rule
in Blue Chip Stamps are equally if not more relevant in the RICO
context, yet if Congress intended to overrule the lOb-5 standing requirement in the RICO context they must have taken these same policy
factors into consideration. In the absence of legislative guidance, the
courts are, at best, left with a difficult choice. The question centers on
the intent of Congress when it added "fraud in the sale of securities"
to the list of potential predicate acts. As Vigman and Zepkin indicate,
it is as equally plausible that Congress meant to retain the Birnbaum
rule as it is that Congress meant to overturn it.
Given the concern over the reach of RICO, and given that there is
no prosecutorial discretion to rely on in civil RICO cases, it seems that
the courts should restrict its use when its applicability is ambiguous and
instead look to the policy considerations outlined by the Supreme Court
in Blue Chip Stamps to uphold the Birnbaum rule in the RICO context.
While certiori has been applied for in the Vigman case, the decision has
63
already been cited approvingly in dicta by at least two district courts.
It is hoped that the Supreme Court will take this opportunity to remedy
the split among the circuits and prevent the Vigman decision from taking
root. In the absence of express legislative guidance, there is simply no
reason to give plaintiffs a shot at treble damages and attorneys' fees
under RICO in an area as sensitive as the securities field when they would
be refused standing to litigate the very same instances of alleged securities
fraud under Rule lOb-5.
In the meantime, it might be possible to read Vigman narrowly and
thus limit its impact. Even though the trustees were the ones standing in

61. Id. at 152-3.
62. Id.at 153.
63. Gutman v. Howard Sav. Bank, 748 F. Supp. 254, 265 n.8 (D.N.J. 1990); Scholes
v. Shroeder, 744 F. Supp. 1419, 1422 (N.D. I11.
1990).

1122

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

the shoes of the defunct firms and who should have been asserting their
claims, if the SIPC brings their claims at least some of the worries expressed
in Blue Chip would be avoided. After all, the SIPC was challenging actual
transactions, not transactions that might or might not have been entered
into in the absence of fraud. Thus, there is no danger of insubstantial
involved
claims supported only by oral testimony, as the SIPC only becomes
64
customers.
real
to
claims
real
on
money
real
paid
has
it
after
Conclusion
In Securities Investor Protection Corporation v. Vigman,65 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that a plaintiff bringing a RICO
claim predicated upon violations of Rule lob-5 did not have to satisfy
the Birnbaum purchaser or seller standing requirement. In doing so, the
Vigman court ignored all of the policy concerns addressed by the Supreme
Court in Blue Chip Stamps." The Vigman court reasoned that RICO is
an express statutory remedy, unlike the remedy afforded by Rule lob-5.
Thus, it was appropriate for the Supreme Court to look to policy factors
in tailoring the reach of the lob-5 implied cause of action while it was
not appropriate for them to examine policy factors in the RICO context.
However, as International Data Bank v. Zepkin67 indicates, it is not
altogether clear that Congress intended to do away with the lOb-5 standing
requirement when it added "fraud in the sale of securities" to the list of
predicate acts. Given this ambiguity and the continuing concern over the
reach of RICO it seems reasonable to look to the policy factors outlined
by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps. In the absence of legislative
guidance, there is little reason to give plaintiffs a shot at treble damages
and attorneys' fees in the sensitive securities area under RICO while at
the same time denying the same plaintiffs standing to pursue ordinary
damages under lOb-5. While, in the meantime, it is possible to give Vigman
a narrow reading and thus perhaps limit its impact, it is hoped the Supreme
Court will grant certiori and resolve the split among the circuits in this
important area of securities law.
Glen E. Mercer

64. Allowing the SIPC to assert the claims of the brokerage firms presents problems
of its own. The trustees have a duty to collect the debts and pursue the rights of the
firm on behalf of all creditors, not just the SIPC. If the trustee abrogates part or all
of its rights to pursue the lOb-5 claims to the SIPC, it could result in the SIPC having
a privilege over other creditors that the SIPC should not have. Such abrogation could
also result in double recovery.
65. 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990).
66. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
67. International Data Bank, LTD. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1987).

